RECENT CASES
Oil and Gas-Interest Created by Grant of Oil and Gas When Right to Use Surface
Has Expired-[Federal].-In 1914 the defendant farmers conveyed to the plaintiff
coal company all "coal, oil and gas" underlying certain described premises. The deed
granted the right to "mine and remove" the named minerals and the right to use as
much of the surface as was necessary for purposes of exploration and production. It
further provided that if the grantees did not select and pay for this surface area within
two years, the right to acquire it would be "at an end." Although the plaintiffs had
never designated any operating area, they contended, twenty-six years after the deed,
that they still had the right to drill for oil and gas and sought an injunction to restrain
the defendants from interfering with their drilling. Held, that although the plaintiffs
had no right to use the surface of the land, they retained the exclusive right to remove
the oil and gas. Chicago, Wilmington & FranklinCoal Co. v. Minier.'
Because of the "vagrant and fugacious" character of oil and gas, courts trying to
apply the traditional property notion that the owner of the surface owns all minerals
beneath have encountered many perplexing problems. Some courts, impressed by the
similarity of fluid to solid minerals, have held that oil and gas can be owned in place,2
although they have been forced to admit that the surface owner's property in the oil
and gas terminates when they are drained from beneath his land by a neighbor.3 Other
courts have held that there can be no ownership of oil and gas in place, and that property in them vests only when they have been brought to the surface and "reduced to
possession."4
The underlying confusion as to the physical properties of oil and gas which has led
to these seemingly inconsistent theories is evident in the opinions of the Supreme Court
of Illinois. Some pattern of development may, however, be discerned. In the earliest
case, Brunerv. Hickss the court determined that an oil and gas lease6 granting the right
to use the surface as long as oil and gas were produced created a freehold interest. Subsequently the description of this interest was qualified by the statement that it would
not support an "action of ejectment or other real action,"7 thus indicating that the
'40

F. Supp. 36 (Ill. 1941).

2Texas Co. v. Daugherty,'xo7 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717 (1915); Stephens County v. MidKansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. i6o, 254 S.W. 290 (1923); Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63
Mont. 372, 207 Pac. 993 (1922); Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324, 27 At. 714 (1893); see Westmoreland and Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, r30 Pa. 235, 18 Atl. 724 (i889).
3 Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. State, 231 S.W. io88 (Tex. Com'n App. r921); Bamard v.
Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 Atl. 8oi (x907); Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 194
Pa. 379, 44 AtI. 1074 (igoo); Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324, 27 Atl. 714 (1893); 1 Summers,

Oil and Gas 117 etseq. (perm. ed. 1938).
4 Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 19o (igoo); Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. (2d) 11o, 43 P.
(2d) 788 (1935); Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Saling's Heirs, iso La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922);
Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86 (r918); Heller v. Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63

N.E.

490 (1902).

s 230 Ill. 536, 82 N.E. 888 (1907).

6 No distinction has been made in Illinois between the interest created under an oil lease
and that created by a grant of oil since both are of indefinite duration, lasting as long as oil and
gas are produced. Triger v. Carter Oil Co., 372 Ill. 182, 23 N.E. (2d) 55 (1939); Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson, 298 Ill. 394, 131 N.E. 645 (1921); Watford Oil and Gas Co. v.
Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N.E. 53 (i9o8).
7 Watford Oil and Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 12, 84 N.E. 53,54 (I9O8).
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court considers the interest non-possessory, i.e., "incorporeal." 8 In addition, the court
has repeatedly held that no interest in the oil and gas in place can be conveyed by
lease or grant.9 In recent decisions construing oil and gas leases and grants the Illinois
court seems to describe the interest created as twofold, consisting of i) the right, either
implied or expressly granted, to use the surface for exploring and producing operations,
and 2) the right to reduce the petroleum, when found, to possession.10 Although the
Illinois court has never done so, one may describe the first of these rights as an easement; the second, as a profit."
Since these two rights would seem to be "incorporeal,"- the court might have found
that the interests of the plaintiff in the instant case had been lost by abandonment.13
8Bigelow and Madden, Introduction to the Law of Real Property 38 (2d ed. 1934); Digby,
History of the Law of Real Property 3o5 et seq. (5th ed. 1897).
9The court has said that a grant of oil was not a grant "of the oil that is in the ground, but
to such part thereof as the grantee may find." Watford Oil and Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9,
12-13, 84 N.E. 53-54 (19o8). This was the first case to make this clear, since the court had
said, .... title to the oil and gas in saidlands did not vest .... until the oil and gas were discovered and appropriated..... " Bruner v. Hicks, 230 Ill. 536, 542, 82 N.E. 888, 891 (19o7)
(italics added). Such language might be construed to mean that upon initial discovery and
appropriation title to the oil and gas in situ vested in the grantee. In the Watford case the
court further stated that oil and gas were not susceptible of ownership distinct from the soil.
This statement is the key to the next step taken by the court in Poe v. Ulrey, 233 Ill. 56, 62, 84
N.E. 46,48 (19o8), where the court said that oil and gas "belong to the owner of the land under
which they are located so long as they remain there, but when they escape and go under other
land the title of the former owner is lost." On the whole, what the Illinois court appears to say
is that the landowner can own the oil and gas beneath his land because this ownership is
coupled with ownership of the soil, but that such ownership may not be effectively transferred
to a grantee or a lessee apart from ownership of the soil. The court has not, however, maintained this position consistently. In Conover v. Parker, 305 Iln. 292, 137 N.E. 204 (1922),
where the court had before it a devise of the oil and gas, and in Triger v. Carter Oil Co., 372
Il1. 182, 23 N.E. (2d) 55 (1939), where the court had a mineral deed under consideration, it
apparently held that these instruments did convey the grantor's interest in the form of ownership of the oil and gas. The court did hold in these cases, however, that the leases to which
these instruments were subject did not convey ownership in place, but only the rights to go
upon the land and to take oil and gas. Thus, an internal inconsistency appears within these
cases. Note 6 supra. They are also inconsistent with the repeated assertion of the Illinois
court, beginning with the Watford case, that there can be no ownership of oil and gas distinct
from the soil.
'° See Triger v. Carter Oil Co., 372 Il. 182, 23 N.E. (2d) 55 (1939); Transcontinental Oil
Co. v. Emmerson, 298 Ill. 394, 131 N.E. 645 (1921); Watford Oil and Gas Co. v. Shipman,
233 Ill. 9, 84 N.E. 53 (I9o8).
" On the other hand, courts which describe the interest created by an oil and gas lease as
a profit imply that the lessee has a right to go on the land from his right to take the oil and
gas. La Laguna Ranch Co. v. Dodge, 114 P. (2d) 351 (Cal. 1941); Hardcastle v. McCluskey,
139 Kan. 757, 33 P. (2d) 127 (1934); Boatman v. Andre, 44 Wyo. 352, 12 P. (2d) 370 (1932);
Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. -2o4, 177 Pac. 86 (1918).
123 Tiffany, Real Property 429 (3 d ed. 1939); Bigelow and Madden, Introduction to the
Law of Real Property 48 (2d ed. z934).
'3 Boatman v. Andre, 44 Wyo. 352, 12 P. (2d) 370 (1932) (profit); Tietjen v. Meldrim, 169

Ga. 678, 151 S.E. 349 (1930) (easement); see Dikes v. Miller, 24Tex. 417, 424 (i859); 3 Wash-

burn, Real Property 6o et seq. (3 d ed. 1868).
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The plaintiffs had evidenced their intent to abandon by failure to designate any surface upon which operations might be conducted and by non-user for twenty-six years.
The failure to discuss this possibility may have been due to the fact that in TranscontinatalOil Co. v. EmversonX4 the.Illinois Supreme Court had said that an oil and gas
lease created a "corporeal interest,"'-s a type of interest which cannot ordinarily be lost
by abandonment. x6 But in that case the question was whether oil and gas leases were
tangible property within the terms of a statute fixing the amount of taxation upon foreign corporations licensed to do business in Illinois. Since the statute defined tangible
property as "corporeal property,"'7 it may be argued that the court's decision characterized the interest as "corporeal" only within the restricted meaning of the statute.' 8
The Transcontinentalcase is consequently not controlling in the instant case.
The practical inability of the plaintiffs to extract oil and gas might be used as an alternative ground for holding that they retained no interest under the grant. This
possibility was suggested by the court: "If it were certain that without the right to
use the surface, the coal company could have no enjoyment of the oil and gas, it might
well be that the grant would fail..... "'9 Such a result the court avoids by suggesting
that the underlying oil and gas might be exploited by means of oblique wells drilled
from adjoining premises. It is questionable, however, whether this expedient constitutes effective "enjoyment" of the oil and gas from the standpoint of either the grantees or the public. In the first place, if the tract involved is large, a very, considerable
part of the oil and gas may be irretrievably lost to the grantees and to the community
for the reason that the effective producing radius of a well is only three to four hundred
feet from the bottom of the hole.20 Second, since the pumping of oblique wells is much
N.E. 645 (1921).
The use of the term "corporeal" to describe the interest created by an oil and gas lease
seems inconsistent with the statement of the Illinois court in Watford Oil and Gas. Co. v.
Shipman, 233 Il. 9, 84 N.E. 53 (Igo8), that such an interest would not sustain an action of
ejectment. Note 8 supra. The interest created by an oil and gas grant or lease, as described by
the Illinois court in previous cases, is elsewhere considered an incorporeal interest. Dark v.
Johnston, 55 Pa. 64 (1867); Kelly v. Keys, 213 Pa. 295, 62 Atl. 911 (io6); Union Petroleum
Co. v. Bliven Petroleum Co., 72 Pa. 173 (,872); Schiffman v. Richfield Oil Co., 8 Cal. (2d) 211,
64 P. (2d) IO8I (1937); Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. (2d) iio, 43 P. (2d) 788 (1935); Rich v.
Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86 (gi8); Kolaclny v. Galbreath, 26 Okla. 772, 11o Pac.
902 (I9IO); Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Saling's Heirs, 15o La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922);
Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 149 La. ioe, 88 So. 723 (1921); Boatman
v. Andre, 44 Wyo. 352, 12 P. (2d) 370 (1932); Burden v. Gypsy Oil Co., 4Z Kan. 147, 4 o P.
(2d) 463 (i935); Ford v. Ball, 7 6 W. Va. 663, 86 S.E. 562 (1915); Walla Walla Oil, Gas & Pipe
Line Co. v. Vallentine, io3 Wash. 359, 174 Pac. 98o (i918); Wagner v. Mallory, 169 N.Y. 5o,
62 N.E. 584 (19o2); Shepherd v. McCalmont Oil Co., 38 Hun (N.Y.) 37 (1885); Heller v.
Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555, 63 N.E. 490 (1902).
6
1 Tietjen v. Meldrim, 169 Ga. 678, iI S.E. 349 (1930); Cameron v. Bustard, uig Wash.
266, 269, 205 Pac. 385, 386 (1922); see United Mining Co. v. Morton, 174 Ky. 366, 377, 192
S.W. 79, 83 (1917); 3 Washburn, Real Property 6o et seq. (3d ed. 1868).
X7Ill. L. (1919) 312, at § 137.
18 In the following year in Conover v. Parker, 305 Ill. 292, 137 N.E. 204 (1922), the same
court said that an oil and gas lease conveyed no interest in the land.
9Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co. v. Minier, 40 F. Supp. 316, 320 (Ill. 1941).
2oSee Glassmire, Oil and Gas Leases and Royalties 20-21 (2d ed. 1938).
14 298 Ill. 394, W
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less efficient than the pumping of normal vertically-drilled wells, operations will become unprofitable more quickly than they otherwise might, resulting in a loss of an
additional portion of the oil and gas. Third, the grantee may find it difficult or impossible to secure drilling rights from a neighbor who can himself drain the oil and gas from
beneath the tract without incurring liability to either the owner of the surface or the
owner of the right to take the oil.
Further difficulties will result. Any rule which would separate the right to use the
surface from the right to take oil and gas would lessen the alienability of both the surface and sub-surface rights to the tract. The separation might preclude the effective
operation and administration of proration or unitization plans for petroleum conservation,21 since the mechanics of these plans are based upon surface area. It would thus
seem preferable to hold that both the right, express or implied, to use the surface and
the right to take the oil and gas must be present in order to sustain a lease or grant of
these minerals.22
Suretyship-Protection of Co-makers under Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
of I94o-[New York].-The plaintiff, co-maker of a note made by a person later inducted into military service, sought a stay of enforcement of his liability on the note
under Section ro3 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 194o.' Held, that
Section io3 authorizes stays only in favor of sureties, guarantors, and endorsers and
hence is inapplicable to co-makers. In re Itzkowitz.'
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 19403 is virtually a reenactment of the
1918 act 4 of the same title. To protect the man in service from undue hardship the act
21These plans are designed to prevent physical and economic waste of oil and gas through
cooperative development by all the owners of land overlying a common source of supply.
N.M. Stat. Ann. (Courtwright, Supp. 1938) c. 97, § 812; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp.
1939) §§ 55-603, 55-604; Okla. Stat. (Harlow, Supp. i94o) § 11574; La. Gen. Stat. Ann.
(Dart, Supp. 1939) § 9482; Ark. Acts (I939) 219.

- Courts discussing the problem indicate that the right to take oil cannot exist without the
right to use the surface. Morgan v. McGee, 117 Okla. 212, 245 Pac. 888 (1926);.see Richfield
Oil Co. v. Hercules Gasoline Co., 112 Cal. App. 431, 434, 297 Pac. 73, 75 (193); In reLathrap,
6i F. (2d) 37,41 (C.C.A. 9th 1932). In the instant case the court mentions the unreported Illi-

nois circuit court opinion, Roth v. Texas Oil Co., which held that where the deed expressly
provided that the right to mine should not include the right to break the surface, the grant of
minerals did not convey the right to drill for oil. The court distinguishes the Roth case as
dealing with the original grant and not with the effect of a condition subsequent as in the
instant case. However, since the basic question in either case is whether the right to the surface may be effectively separated from the right to take the oil and gas, there seems to be no
distinction between such separation in an original grant and separation as the result of operation of a condition subsequent.
154 Stat. 1178, at § 103 (x94o), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 513 (Supp. 194). This section
1918 act. 4o Stat. 44o (i918), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § io4 (Supp.
'94').
2 177 Misc. 269, 30 N.Y.S. (2d) 336 (S. Ct. 1941).
3 54 Stat. 1178, at § ioo et seq. (i94o), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 51o et seq. (Supp.

is identical with § 103 of the

194').
4 4o Stat. 44o, at § too et seq. (I918), 5o U.S.C.A. App. § ioi et seq. (Supp. 1941). The
few changes in phraseology were made because the United States was not at war in 194o.

